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LEARNING IN THE LAW AND ADMISSION TO
PRACTICE
BERNARD

C. GAVIT

In view of the fact that I started the argument I am entitled
to a few words in the nature of a closing argument.
I want merely to call attention to the fact that Mr. Hurley
still keeps his end of the subject immersed in generalities and
that the only evidence he produces to sustain his position is his
own self-serving declaration. The quotations which he sets out
read well, but decide nothing. I should be willing to accept
them at their face value and ask, what application do they have
to this specific situation? But on the other hand I should also
be interested to know what the court decided in each of those
cases in addition to what it said. I always got little comfort
out of the preliminary general statements by the courts, when
they actually decided the case against me. It's another situation where actions speak louder than words, and is somewhat
equivalent to the one where X hits me in the face while assuring
me, "Now I'm not hitting you." I'm inclined to believe that the
latter is just talk and has little to do with the merits of the
case.
The only case Mr. Hurley refers to with which offhand I am
familiar is the case of Gibbons v. Ogden. The case is the basic
one construing the Commerce Clause in the Federal Constitution. I should like to have anyone show me how the language
which is quoted formed a rule of guidance for the court in that
case or in any of the subsequent eight hundred cases in the Supreme Court construing the Commerce Clause. How do the
holdings that insurance is not interstate commerce, but a correspondence school is business follow from that language? Why
is it that a state privilege tax is a regulation of interstate commerce, but a property tax is not? Why is it that a state quarantine law prohibiting the interstate shipment of diseased cattle
is not a regulation of interstate commerce, but that a Federal
quarantine law prohibiting the same action is one? Why is it
that "commerce" includes non-business transactions?,
1 Witness the cases under the White Slave Act.
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Can one go back and decide that latter question on the "intention" of the people? All that is necessary is to give to the
word its normal meaning, and while many people might assume
that "commerce" necessarily includes a business transaction if
he take the trouble to consult a dictionary he will find that the
Supreme Court's definition is in accordance with good common usage.
No evidence has been produced so far to the effect that either
the Constitutional Convention or the people used the phrase
"good moral character" in anything other than its good common
usage. Since my other articles were written I have consulted
the files of one of the leading newspapers of the state covering
the time in question, and there is no expression of opinion in it
on the subject. The truth is that very, very little was said on
any phase of the constitution, and it seems to have been adopted
without discussion and as a matter of course.
"Good moral character," then is to be determined pragmatically, and I assert again that all of the evidence indicates quite
conclusively that the proper definition of the phrase includes
mental honesty. The thing is so obvious that there is little use
to argue the matter further.
But it may be well to call attention to the fact that the constitution really adds nothing to the common law requirement. It
was always a prerequisite to the practice of law. In the Federal
Courts, where there is no statute governing the matter, it is
nevertheless the law that "good moral character" is required. 2
In the case quoted the court decided that exact and full truthfulness was a part of it. The attorney in that case concealed what
he should have revealed. It proves the proposition heretofore
advanced; that is, that a person may be convicted of a lack of
character by what appears to be only an omission, but which
nevertheless as affirmatively shows a lack of character as would
the commission of a serious crime.
Other states employing the phrase in statutory requirements
have consistently construed it as including more than physical
morality and have emphatically said that a lack of it may be
proved by conduct which is neither criminal, nor in the ordinary
individual reprehensible.3 Would it not be indeed strange if we
2 See, e. g., In re Thatcher, 190 Fed. 969 (1911).

3 See e. g., case and note 69 L. R. A. 701, and In re
42 N. W. 221 (1889).

(Wis.),
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set a high professional standard for character after one is
licensed to practice, but said that character at the time of his
application for admission was something less than that? He
can be disbarred for mental dishonesty; must he be admitted
only to be disbarred? The Indiana cases and all of the cases
give the lie to that proposition, for it is quite consistently held
that one can only be disbarred for reasons sufficient to have kept
him out in the first instance.
In conclusion I want again to call attention to the fact that
the Denny and Boswell cases decide nothing on the question of
good moral character; and Mr. Hurley's assertion that "in effect"
they do is not borne out by his own statement of the cases. In
both of those cases the trial court found that the applicant did
possess a good moral character, and the correctness of that conclusion was neither presented nor decided.' The only point upon
which either case is a precedent is as to the adoption of the
constitutional amendments.
Despite Mr. Hurley's assertions to the contrary I have never
contended that there is any ambiguity in the phrase in question.
My arguments have been, first, that the phrase defined in its
common meaning means more than physical morality and includes mental honesty; second, that there is no evidence that
either the Constitutional Convention or the people used it as
specifically meaning the same thing as if they had said "good
moral character, not including mental honesty ;"4 third, that if
we accept the proposition that the factual content of the phrase
in 1852 did not include more than physical morality accepted
principles of constitutional interpretation allow the court today
to give it its modern factual content. In other words the phrase
expresses an idea, the specific content of which may damage.
The instances are innumerable where Constitutional language
has been so construed. And fourth, it is still arguable in any
event, and in the light of the early authorities, that the Constitution sets a minimum and not a maximum requirement.
Mr. Hurley has attempted to meet only the first of those
propositions and the only evidence he adduces is his own opinion.
4 Evidence is sometimes admissible to prove the exact intention of a
convention or legislature. As pointed out several times heretofore the only
available evidence points to the conclusion that the specific intent was:
"good moral character, including mental honesty."
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It is, of course, entitled to some weight, but I believe that the
clear preponderance of the evidence lies with the original proposition. The dictionary sustains it; a jury of laymen has so decided; all of the authorities in the field of ethics sustain it; the
earlier cases and legislation in this state sustain it, as well as
the authorities from other states.

